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Internal Revenue Service because of alleged efforts by the club to influence legislation.

In addition, I have consistently supported conservation legislation in which most members of the Sierra Club are vitally interested.

In light of my attitude and consistent support, I was totally shocked to notice an insert in the bulletin, entitled "Environment 1970 and the 'Vote.'" This insert was a 100-percent misrepresentation of my attitude on environmental matters.

This issue of the Sierra Club Bulletin listed the votes of every Member of the House on two rollcalls. The first was a vote on the rule on the national timber supply bill. The second was a rollcall vote on the "previous question" for the Department of Transportation appropriation bill. The Sierra Club Bulletin rated a vote against the rule on the national timber supply bill as a favorable environmental vote, and it also rated a vote against the previous question as favorable.

Both of these were purely procedural or parliamentary questions upon which the editors of the Sierra Club Bulletin and others have placed their own interpretations. I disagree with their interpretation and contend that they have misrepresented my position on the two issues involved.

Let us examine these two rollcall votes.

I was against the national timber supply bill, and was committed to vote against it. But the vote was not on the bill itself. Rather it was on a resolution which did nothing more than establish the conditions under which the bill would be debated.

Let us read the resolution itself:

H. RES. 790

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12925) to provide for the more efficient development and improved management of national forest commercial forest land, to establish a high timber yield fund, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Agriculture, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Agriculture now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, and all points of order against sections 4 and 5 of said amendment in the nature of a substitute are hereby waived. At the conclusion of such consideration, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

Mr. Speaker, was this a vote on the National Timber Supply Act? It was not,

and the Sierra Club is misrepresenting the situation if it contends otherwise.

For the past 18 years, I have never voted against a rule unless I considered it unduly restrictive or defective. I believe the House should have the right to debate and consider a matter and then vote on it. To defeat a rule is to deny debate and free expression. There is no place in a democracy for "gag rules" which stifle debate and discussion.

I resent being classified as against the environment because I believe in orderly procedure.

Now let us examine the second rollcall vote.

During debate on the Department of Transportation bill, I took the floor and clearly stated my opposition to including funds for a supersonic transport. My remarks can be found at page H4890 of the May 28 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I would like unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, that these remarks which include a colloquy between myself, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSHALL), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES) be included at the conclusion of my remarks.

These remarks clearly stated my desire to vote against funds for an SST.

During the teller vote on this subject, I voted against the SST and in favor of the Yates amendment to delete funds for that purpose. While teller votes are not recorded, it is interesting that an ad hoc committee which observed Members voting on the Yates amendment, stated that I did vote against the SST. This was reported in the Washington Evening Star for June 1, 1970, and I quote a portion of this article:

The anti-SST gallery watchers also identified five other representatives who, they say, voted in favor of the Yates amendment, then also voted in favor of the motion to call the previous question.

Those members are Reps. Kenneth J. Gray, D-Ill.; Charles S. Gubser, R-Calif.; Rogers C. B. Morton, R-Md.; William A. Steiger, R-Wis., and John Wold, R-Wyo.

Gubser publicly explained prior to the vote that he would vote for the Yates amendment because he opposed the SST but would not oppose the previous question because he viewed it only as a parliamentary motion. Others in the category apparently felt the same way.

The record vote referred to by the Sierra Club was on the "previous question" which again is a parliamentary or procedural matter. The Sierra Club Bulletin editors had no justification for placing their own arbitrary and substantive interpretation upon a purely parliamentary question. Furthermore, had the editors read my remarks at page H4890 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, it would have been obvious that they were misrepresenting my position.

Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to conclude that my voting record was intentionally distorted by the editors of the Sierra Club Bulletin, and I will not so conclude; but I must say with regret that these editors did not make a reasonable effort to fairly present my position.

I note in this published voting record that my colleague, the Honorable PAUL "PETE" McCloskey, is reported as being

paired on the "previous question" vote for a position which was for the environment. This is indeed a fair statement because my colleague has been outspokenly in favor of conservation. But being paired for a certain position amounts to no more than making an expression in the RECORD of this position. This being the case, I must ask the Sierra Club why it did not, in fairness, state the position which I made during the debate on page 4890. This was also a statement of my position, and it was made in the House Chamber. Had the editors looked beyond the strictly procedural rollcall, they could not have reported me as voting in opposition to the environment. They could easily have determined that earlier in the day the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey), and I had both voted by tellers to delete funds for the SST.

The Sierra Club Bulletin says:

These two votes reveal better than any previous index the degree to which each congressman has committed himself to conservation.

In my case, the opposite of the truth is revealed.

Mr. Speaker, thousands of citizens in my district have been given a 100 percent false impression regarding the degree of my commitment to conservation as a result of this article. I call upon the editors of the Sierra Club Bulletin to do the honest thing, and to correct this unjustified distortion of the truth.

The remarks, found at pages H4890-H4891 of the RECORD, follows:

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I take this time for the purpose of urging my colleagues in the minority who will control the motion to recommit to offer it with a specific deletion of funds for the SST. My reason for asking that is that I am personally opposed to the SST at this time because I think there are much higher priority requirements for our national resources, and I would like a chance to express myself on the record accordingly.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. GUBSER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. As a member of the minority, I would like to say to my good friend from California if that possibility does present itself and the parliamentary situation enables me to present a motion to recommit with instructions to delete the SST money, I will make that motion.

There is always the possibility that I will not be recognized, because of House precedents, in defense to a more senior minority member of the appropriations committee but shall have such a motion at the Clerk's desk.

However, there are certainly parliamentary procedures and customs that might prevent me from doing that. I would merely like to say I think this program should be delayed for at least a year under present conditions.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman from Ohio. I certainly hope he does have the opportunity he seeks.

I understood that of the motion to recommit does not specifically include this deletion, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES) will ask for a vote against the previous question so that he would then have the opportunity of offering an amendment to the motion to recommit which would delete fund for the SST.

This would be a very difficult situation, because it will be nationally interpreted—and I might add wrongfully interpreted—as a vote on the issue of the SST when in fact, it is nothing more than a vote on a strictly procedural matter.

Here is where a question of legislative philosophy enters into the problem. We hear a great deal of talk about minorities these days, but let us not forget that they are other minorities than racial. There are political and philosophical minorities as well.

The majority has the numbers, it has the chairmanship of every committee, it has a majority of every committee, and it has a decisive power to which it is entitled because the electorate has bestowed it. One of the powers and one of the checks and balances in our system which is given to the minority so that it can exert a reasonable influence on public policy is the motion to recommit. On at least two occasions within the last week we have seen another, where because of outside interpretation the motion to recommit becomes a vote on an issue instead of a procedural matter. We are about to see another such situation. The sum total of effect is that it takes away from the minority the protection and a right provided under House rules.

It transfers the minority's rightful authority and power to the majority. This is an erosion of fair parliamentary procedure and a dangerous precedent.

I cannot vote against the previous question for these reasons, but I do want to vote against the SST. I cannot adopt the dangerous practice of consistently transferring the rights of the minority over to the majority which already has the overwhelming power to legislate as it sees fit.

I sincerely hope that the minority will give us the chance to record our votes on the specific issue of the SST.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. Certainly I am sure, even though I am the ranking Republican on this subcommittee, that if I offer a motion to recommit to delete the SST, the motion would be taken away from me.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I think we might appeal to the sporting blood in the House and let the Members vote on my amendment and then let them vote on a rollcall on the motion to recommit.

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield.

Mr. TALCOTT. I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him for taking this special order to inform and clarify the positions often taken by certain groups of lobbyists, particularly the Sierra Club in two recent incidents.

Twice this year the Sierra Club has misrepresented the voting records of many Members of the Congress including myself. Each time the club has tried to excuse its sloppy reporting by claiming inadequate staff or the system of voting in the House of Representatives or both. All three excuses are lame and misleading.

First, a minimum of time, research, and scholarship could have produced a more accurate report of my voting record. I believe the Sierra Club relies on incompetent lobbyists in that they purposefully misrepresent positions to intimidate or embarrass certain Members

of the Congress. This method or attitude should be corrected as it will not be successful in the long run.

The gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) has quite accurately presented and explained the parliamentary situation occurring during the consideration of the national forest management bill and the supersonic transport amendment to the appropriation bill. I will not reiterate in the interest of time. I concur with his analysis.

My views on both bills were misrepresented. My views were easily ascertainable. The Sierra Club bulletin is not an accurate representation of Members' records for or against conservation measures in general or the records of Members on these two particular issues.

In complete candor I must say that I am not opposed to all management of our national forests. Some management is probably necessary for their protection and conservation. But I opposed the national timber supply bill in the form proposed by H.R. 12025. I said so many times publicly and in letters to many constituents.

Also I state that I voted and spoke against the appropriation for the SST on May 28, 1970. I gave my reasons then.

I believe the editors of the Sierra Club Bulletin ought to correct their report of June 1970. I believe they ought to employ more scholarship in their reports. Their readers are entitled to fair and accurate reports. Members of the Congress are also entitled to accurate reports. I shall look for a correction in an early issue of the Sierra Club Bulletin.

THE ROAD TO PEACE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROBISON) is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. ROBISON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, a sense of disillusionment and frustration afflicts us all when we consider our dilemma in Vietnam. This is not, of course, the first time we have been deeply divided as a nation—nor will it probably be the last—but the ingredients for a spiritual disaster are now all around us, reflecting a failing of the American people generally to believe as they once did in the workings of their institutions.

The tragic war in Vietnam—with its other costs beyond those measurable in blood and treasure—is not the sole cause of this situation. By all odds, however, it must be judged a major contributor to our national unease; for, out of our irresolution concerning that war, has arisen what John W. Gardner recently termed the "serious pathologies of dissent—together with the frightening trend toward repression."

None of us who serve in this body can be immune to all this. But, surely, we are charged with the responsibility of doing more than merely succumbing to that mood or adding to it.

Instead, as Mr. Gardner has also suggested:

Those of us who are in the thick of action must believe we at least have a chance to work for a better future.

Mr. Speaker, it was my recent privilege, by virtue of your nomination, to have been a member of the Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia which this House sent to that part of our vastly troubled world. I accepted that assignment with certain misgivings as to what, if anything, we could accomplish, but with the hope—a very humble hope, I assure my colleagues—that out of our mission could come some light to help guide our future path.

The select committee has now rendered its report to the House; not, I think, the best sort of report it was capable of producing, but still one deserving more attention than it has so far received and, absent the publicity given one facet thereof, probably would have received.

Let me not be misunderstood, for there has already been too much misunderstanding about the Con Son Island prison incident and the conditions there that two of our members found and described as "shocking." In now making only passing reference to that discovery, I do not mean to downgrade its importance—nor to suggest that any of us hope for anything less than the early elimination of such conditions. But I do mean to suggest that this incident, which has now been subjected to the full glare of public scrutiny, ought not to be allowed to obscure all the other matters of substance we have to report to you, Mr. Speaker, and to our colleagues.

What are those other matters?

Well, each of the 12 of us will place different interpretations on the various things we saw, and heard, in South Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, and in the other parts of Southeast Asia some of us visited. There will also be differences among us as to the comparative importance of those items.

Nevertheless, I believe it can be said that there is a rough consensus among us as to certain of those items—a consensus the report, as originally submitted, does not adequately highlight. In preparing to try to do that, now, I should add that I have circularized an advance text of these remarks among my fellow committee members, thus inviting them to participate in this special order and to take exceptions, where they wish, to what I will have to say, so that this record may be as accurate as possible under the circumstances. It should be further understood that I have no intention of trying to bind those committee members who cannot, or who do not wish to, participate in this exercise so that, where such may be the case, these remarks stand as mine, alone.

With that by way of preliminary, let me begin by saying that I believe all of us were impressed by the apparent gains made under the so-called pacification program. Both metropolitan Saigon and the countryside were far more "secure" than, I think, most of us had anticipated; and, for those of us who have been to South Vietnam before, as I had not, demonstrably more so than at the time of our previous visit or visits. As is noted

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in our report, perhaps the best evidence of this is the manner by which committee members, themselves, traveled at will throughout the countryside—and much of the time without any sort of military escort—and, if surface appearances mean anything, to most of us the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people now seem to be leading fairly normal lives, if there is such a thing in a nation at war.

Most of us were equally impressed by at least the statistical evidence of the progress that has been made toward training and arming a regional and popular force—comparable to our National Guard—of over 500,000 individuals. This force is supplemented by a somewhat questionably named “combat-ready” people’s self defense force—that can be likened to a local militia—with a strength of over 1 million persons sharing something like 350,000 miscellaneous firearms among them. The mission of these paramilitary forces, in the training of which U.S. military personnel have assisted, is to help restore and then maintain security in the countryside.

The question of political stability has always had a special pertinency for anyone seeking to gage South Vietnam’s chances of surviving on its own—a subject on which I shall have more to say in a moment. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the present government has strongly promoted this program of arming the populace bespeaks something about its own self-confidence in the future.

But, as our report indicates—and I would now encourage those who have not yet read it to do so—the pacification program is not without its rough spots, nor by any stretch of the imagination can the progress made under its several facets be considered as permanent in nature. Nevertheless, I believe there was a consensus among us to the effect that the pacification program is working and that, if the presently favorable climate for its continued progress holds, one can look for further, substantial gains to be made under it during the next 6 months or so.

I have purposely adopted a time-frame of 6 months because I believe there was also a consensus among us to the effect that the Cambodian sanctuary operation—or “incursion,” if one prefers—was a clear, if temporary, military success in terms of giving both the pacification program and its companion, the Vietnamization program, at least that much more time within which to show further progress.

Our general optimism in this regard, however, has to be tempered by the new uncertainties that have been brought into the overall picture by the spreading of the war into Cambodia, itself, now. Since there were obvious differences of opinion among us with respect to this aspect of the Cambodian operation, I do not believe it useful to try to pursue a committee consensus concerning what our policy should be towards Cambodia. It desires to be noted, however, that none of us—so far as I could ascertain—appeared willing to support direct military assistance to the Lon Nol government

even if, without such assistance, it might fall to the Communists. Instead, most of us appeared to favor encouraging the kind of regional, self-help defense efforts that Representative KERR discusses in his helpful separate views—provided, of course, no shorter route to peace for Indochina can be found by way of some form of political settlement.

However, getting back to South Vietnam, I think it can be said that, while most of us saw a successful pacification program as being essential to the government’s survival, we came away from Vietnam keenly aware of the fact that such survival also depends on its people’s ability to erect a viable economy and to bring order out of its presently chaotic political system.

On this dual question, I believe there was unanimity among us to the effect that South Vietnam now faces a complex economic problem which poses a greater threat to it than any military threat at the present time. This problem, with its attendant political consequences, is concentrated in Saigon. In this sense, Saigon represents one economic and political problem and the countryside quite another—something all of us might well try to bear in mind as we project the political future of a Thieu-Ky regime that seems to have decided to run the risk of pacifying the countryside first, before dealing with its internal but Saigon-oriented economic concerns.

This is a substantial political risk. Evidence of growing discontent with the Thieu-Ky government abounds, at least in Saigon, where student dissenters have stepped up their attacks on the government as being “corrupt, unjust, and dictatorial,” disabled war veterans have been pushing their demands with equal vigor, and there are growing threats of labor strife. Inflationary pressures—and the political reaction thereto—require the immediate attention of both the government and the National Assembly, but there are signs of an early response. In the meantime, political opposition to President Thieu grows but, with South Vietnam’s plethora of political parties, fails to coalesce around any one potential opponent.

So I would also venture to say that, after observing all this, most of us saw no political alternative to President Thieu at the moment. Some of us did talk, in Saigon, to representatives of the several important Buddhist factions, which have spearheaded earlier “opposition” movements but now seem more politically cautious. Some of us also talked with leaders of the so-called “Third-Force” movement which argues that there should be some middle-ground choice for the people of South Vietnam between the Vietcong, on the one hand, and a government with as little popular support as Thieu-Ky enjoy, on the other. This suggestion seems to have considerable appeal to those South Vietnamese who are politically aware—a state of mind that may exist now in Saigon but is rare, except on a purely local level, in the countryside. And it is in the countryside where the support President Thieu can count on next year through his per-

sonally appointed province-chief-to-district-chief apparatus would seem to guarantee his reelection, hands down.

Of course, President Thieu needs—as we have often been told—to “broaden his political base,” even if only in his own self-interest. There may be ways we could use to better encourage him to do so—though it would be my personal observation that he is far less of an “American puppet” than some people have pictured him. But, even if this should be a desirable thing for us to be promoting, one supposes the same thing could be said with regard to Thieu’s potential opposition, all of which could get pretty sticky if we really mean what we are saying about turning this war—in all its aspects—back over to the South Vietnamese.

Whatever commitment we have in South Vietnam is to its people, and certainly not to the Thieu-Ky regime. However, to those who have been arguing that all we need do to restore peace to Vietnam is to “withdraw our support from Thieu and Ky,” I would say it is not as simple as all that. The Thieu-Ky regime exists—even as does the war itself—and I see no practical way of withdrawing our support from that government, whatever its faults may be, unless we are prepared, simply and more or less precipitately, to withdraw from South Vietnam altogether; something I do not believe a majority of our citizens is presently willing to support.

What, then, can and should we do?

That question brings me, finally, to the Vietnamization program—under which we are trying to “de-Americanize” this conflict, in both its military and political aspects, in such a way as to make whatever government there may be in Saigon increasingly responsible for what happens next in South Vietnam. It is impossible for us to write this particular script—much as we might like to—for the one lesson we should by now have drawn from this whole, unhappy experience is that our power, that has sometimes seemed limitless to us, just does not extend that far.

Mr. Speaker, in the supplemental views I submitted to accompany the committee’s printed report, I addressed myself at some length to certain of the developing problems, as I saw them, with regard to the Vietnamization program. In order that easy reference may be had thereto, I now ask unanimous consent that those supplemental views be made a part of these remarks, at the conclusion thereof.

In those views, I ventured to say that our committee—while expressing its general support for the concept of Vietnamization—had not sought a consensus as to whether or not it felt this key program could, and should, be accelerated. Instead, we contented ourselves by merely noting that: “As far as ground troops are concerned, America should continue its withdrawal program at least as fast as is now scheduled.”

Perhaps it would have been impossible for us to have arrived at a more specific agreement on this very important question. However—and this is a point I wish to stress—it now appears from several of the supplemental views as submitted

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by individual committee members, that more than a few of us were of the opinion, on leaving Vietnam, that the rate of our withdrawal, first from participation in ground combat, and then in terms of artillery and air support, both could and should be accelerated. It was my own opinion, as set forth in my supplemental views, that we ought to aim with more precision than we have, as a matter of policy, to be out of all ground combat activities in South Vietnam before next May 1, and to phase out the balance of our direct military support activities in Vietnam by July 1, 1972—getting down by that date, I might now add, to certainly no larger a residual military presence in South Vietnam than whatever logistical and liaison personnel might be needed in the event—absent a prior political settlement—we were then still aiding South Vietnam through programs of military assistance or supporting assistance.

The main thrust of President Nixon's policy toward Vietnam would clearly seem to be running in this same direction—and the President may well have a roughly-similar timeframe for withdrawal in mind though, for obvious reasons, he does not wish to commit himself publicly to it. Those reasons, one must assume, center around his felt need to keep the timing of our exit from South Vietnam flexible enough so that our remaining forces there would encounter a minimum of danger, and so that what might be called a "power-vacuum" would not be created overnight. In addition, the President quite likely sees some value in using Hanoi's uncertainty as to our precise intentions as a lever to encourage it in the direction of a political settlement.

In light of all the attendant uncertainties—and Mr. Nixon's special responsibilities as Commander in Chief of U.S. troops that were committed to actual combat by someone other than he—I do not see the President's position as being unreasonable. Indeed, it is a position with certain advantages.

However, there are certain disadvantages as well—both to the President and to the Nation. The same uncertainty that may work as a positive lever on Hanoi to move it, at last, towards meaningful negotiations, provides us with little more than negative leverage on the Thieu-Ky government—and the other, diverse and divided political elements in South Vietnam—in order to convince them, all, of the fact that we are, indeed, "going home," and that there is an urgent necessity for them to pull themselves together. They must decide, within a shorter period of time than they now seem to contemplate, what kind of political arrangements in the South are supportable on a long-term basis without substantial, continuing U.S. military assistance.

Mr. Speaker, we of this Congress have been privileged—whether we have appreciated it or not—to be participants or mere by-standers in an historic foreign-policy debate. That debate still goes on, as it should, concentrating on the very difficult questions relating to the congressional power to "declare war", and the powers and responsibilities of the

President as Commander in Chief once our Armed Forces are actually committed to combat in a war, whether formally "declared" as such or not.

In this instance, this debate is complicated by the fact—no matter how some of us may deplore it—that our Armed Forces are already deeply involved in a shooting war in South Vietnam; a war that now threatens to spill over into other parts of former Indochina.

There are those among us who propose that we should mandate upon the President, as Commander in Chief of those forces, a date by which they must all be withdrawn from that conflict; letting, as it were, the "chips" thereafter fall where they may.

At the same time, there are those others among us who—with equal sincerity—share the President's concern about the possible effect of a withdrawal deadline upon the safety of our last-remaining troops in South Vietnam and see the responsibilities we rightly or wrongly have assumed for the people of South Vietnam as requiring something more of us than merely leaving the scene of combat, now that we no longer find it to our liking.

And, therein—as I see it—lies the fatal flaw in the policy we call "Vietnamization," or in a mere withdrawal from the conflict. For a policy of withdrawal, standing by itself, fails to deal with the central, political issues underlying the Vietnam conflict, almost certainly forecasts continued political and military strife in South Vietnam even after all our troops have departed therefrom, and totally fails to address itself to the developing and disturbing problems now engaging our attention in such other parts of former Indochina as Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. Speaker, these are the dimensions of our present dilemma—as best I can state them; and a most difficult and agonizing dilemma it is.

However, as I said in the beginning, we "who are in the thick of action" must believe we can do something constructive to help resolve it.

The way things have shaped up, the legislative alternatives at the moment would seem to be a mandated withdrawal deadline, as proposed in House Resolution 1000—and in the Hatfield-McGovern-Goodell-Hughes counterpart thereof in the other body—or no action at all. I say this because I do not believe that even the most ardent supporters of House Resolution 1000 believe it has a chance in this body and, despite the intensive national campaign being waged in behalf of its Senate counterpart, most objective observers now see only a slim chance for that proposal, especially since the so-called "Cooper-Church" debate.

Should this assessment prove correct, Mr. Speaker, then this Congress will end its days—like its immediate predecessors—having totally failed to address itself to our problems in Southeast Asia in a positive and constructive fashion.

I believe we must do better.

I believe we must undertake to share with the President the burden of shaping our national purpose abroad in this troubled world, and that enough time

still remains in this session for us to begin to do so.

Accordingly, I have today introduced a concurrent resolution, the text of which is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 698

Whereas the United States of America heretofore undertook, wisely or not, to guarantee the right of the people of South Vietnam to "self-determination" in the face of what was considered to be externally-supported aggression; and

Whereas the people of the United States of America accordingly have made an unprecedented effort and sacrifice in support of that ambition including, despite the absence of any formal declaration of war on the part of the Congress of the United States, acceptance of a direct combat role for the armed forces of the United States of America in the aforesaid conflict for a longer period of time now than any other war in which they have ever been engaged; and

Whereas, while the people of South Vietnam have suffered grievous losses as a result of this protracted conflict, the number of American servicemen wounded in action in South Vietnam and adjoining areas already exceeds those wounded in World War I and the combat deaths of American servicemen in South Vietnam and adjoining areas will, at the present rate, also shortly exceed those sustained in World War I; and

Whereas it would seem that the people of the United States have met, many times over, whatever commitment they may have had to the people of South Vietnam; and

Whereas the Constitution of the United States expressly delegates to the President of the United States the authority to act as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . . when called into the actual service of the United States"; and

Whereas the President, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief of such armed forces, is currently pursuing a policy of gradual withdrawal of United States armed forces from both a direct combat or combat-supporting role in the aforesaid conflict, which policy is generally referred to as a policy of "Vietnamization" and includes the physical withdrawal of United States troops from South Vietnam and adjoining areas; and

Whereas the President has reported and other observers have confirmed that United States efforts to train and equip the armed forces of South Vietnam, in order to prepare them to assume full responsibility for securing internal order in their nation and the full burden of combat in protecting it against continued, externally-supported aggression, have been proceeding satisfactorily and that progress thereunder, so far, has even been exceeding our original expectations; and

Whereas, in furtherance of such policy and in light of its progress, the President, as Commander in Chief, has already physically withdrawn over 115,000 United States troops from South Vietnam and adjoining areas and has announced plans for a further reduction of 150,000 troops therein on or before May 1, 1971; and

Whereas this policy of a gradual withdrawal of the United States military presence in South Vietnam, leading eventually to a total military withdrawal therefrom, appears to now be our official policy regarding South Vietnam even though the same has not yet been formally recognized or endorsed as such by the Congress of the United States; and

Whereas there is broad support among the American people and within their Congress for such a policy of withdrawal, and a developing consensus to the effect that the United States has now done about all it can, militarily speaking, for the people of South Vietnam and that the time is fast approaching when they should be left to their own devices and determination; and

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Whereas there are wide differences of opinion within the Congress regarding both the Constitutional and practical limits of the President's powers and responsibilities as Commander in Chief, especially when considered in conjunction with the broad powers and responsibilities concerning foreign policy separately delegated under the Constitution to the Congress, including specifically its sole power "To declare War . . . (and) To raise and support Armies"; and

Whereas those differences of opinion now largely center around the question of whether or not the Congress can or should, in a situation such as that now pertaining in South Vietnam, mandate upon the President, as Commander in Chief of United States armed forces already committed to combat, a date or deadline by which they should all be removed from such combat, and

Whereas it appears unlikely that this question can be satisfactorily resolved one way or the other in the 91st Congress, now meeting in session in Washington, thus leaving open for the time being many questions concerning our Government's official policy regarding South Vietnam to which this Congress should nevertheless address itself in as positive and constructive a fashion as possible; and

Whereas a policy of "Vietnamization", standing by itself and no matter how successful, automatically raises certain questions, among which are: (a) Whether or not it is intended to be irreversible in nature; (b) Its failure to deal with the central, political issues underlying the Vietnam conflict, thus forecasting continued political and military strife in South Vietnam even after all United States troops have been withdrawn therefrom, and (c) Its failure to address itself to the developing and disturbing political and military problems now engaging our attention in such other nations of former Indochina as Laos and Cambodia; and

Whereas the President has repeatedly pledged, as did his predecessor, that "we seek no wider war" in Southeast Asia and, furthermore, has recently reaffirmed as a matter of national policy the fact that, in his words: "A political settlement is the heart of the matter . . . (and that) is what the fighting in Indochina has been about over the past 30 years"; and

Whereas the burden of United States efforts to bring peace to South Vietnam and to Southeast Asia, generally, whether those efforts are to be successful or not, should not fall solely on the President of the United States, but rather should be a responsibility shared both by the President and the Congress of the United States; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress hereby declares that it is the national policy to avoid any further enlargement of the present conflict in South Vietnam and to do everything possible to bring a just peace to South Vietnam and to Southeast Asia, generally, by virtue of a negotiated settlement of the political issues now dividing the people and the nations thereof; and be it further

Resolved, That the Congress hereby declares its support of any and all efforts made or to be made by the President, and encourages further efforts on his part, to achieve such a negotiated settlement, including efforts to arrange a cease-fire in South Vietnam and surrounding countries and including efforts to involve the United Nations in whatever way can best encourage an end to this war; and, pending any such form of settlement, be it further

Resolved, That the Congress hereby declares that it is the national policy to continue, on an irreversible basis, United States troop withdrawals from South Vietnam and adjoining areas, and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of Congress that all American servicemen in South Vietnam or adjoining areas should be withdrawn from any and all participation in ground combat activities therein on or before May 1, 1971, except insofar as it may be necessary for such troops remaining therein after such date to defend themselves or their positions; and be it further

Resolved, That it is further the sense of Congress that all other American servicemen, including those specifically engaged in combat-support activities, should be withdrawn from South Vietnam or adjoining areas on or before July 1, 1972, and be it further

Resolved, That the Congress hereby reaffirms its constitutional right and responsibility of consultation with the President on all matters mentioned within this resolution, and fully expect to be included in the decision-making process on all matters, now and henceforth, affecting grave national decisions of war and peace.

Mr. Speaker, as you can see, the resolution reestablishes—as the primary goal of our policy for Southeast Asia—the search for a negotiated settlement of the political issues now dividing the people and the nations thereof, and it then goes on to support the initiatives the President has already made in this connection and encourages such further "new initiatives" in this direction as he may deem fruitful.

Next, the resolution adopts "Vietnamization"—pending such a settlement—as a national policy, which is something Congress has not yet done, and undertakes to describe our military withdrawal from South Vietnam under that policy as being "irreversible" in nature even as various administration spokesmen have described it.

Finally, the resolution addresses itself to the totality of our intention to withdraw militarily from South Vietnam and sets forth the sense of Congress—without attempting a mandate—as to the time-frame within which that process should be completed. In so doing, it retains for the President the flexibility to maneuver that he ought to have as Commander in Chief, while at the same time giving him, some needed, additional leverage, in order to "Vietnamize" the search for peace in Saigon even as we are now seeking to "Vietnamize" whatever may remain of the war, itself.

Mr. Speaker, I have no illusions. I offer no panacea—no "instant solution" for our problems in Southeast Asia.

I have no particular pride of authorship in the resolution. I am not wedded to its language, and it is obviously subject to improvement.

But I hope and believe I have offered a reasonable and attainable legislative suggestion that is wholly in line with our basic responsibilities in the field of foreign policy—as well as something that, prayfully, might somehow advance that desire for peace that is common to the people of Southeast Asia and the people of the United States, alike.

I include the following supplemental views:

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

(By Representative HOWARD W. ROBISON, New York, to accompany report to the House of Representatives by "the select committee on United States involvement in Southeast Asia," as filed for printing on July 6, 1970, and referred to the committee

of the Whole House on the State of the Union)

Although I was one of the sponsors of the resolution creating a "Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia," and one of those voting for that resolution as it passed the House on June 15, last, I had not sought assignment to that committee. This was largely because I had certain reservations about what such a committee could really accomplish, certain doubts about whether such a committee, when appointed, could be truly representative of the wide differences of opinion so apparent both in Congress and in the Nation relative to what our role in Southeast Asia should be, and certain fears that such a committee, like other "fact-finding" commissions before it, would not be able, despite the best of intentions, to take a fully-free, independent and objective look at our situation in South Vietnam and other pertinent parts of Southeast Asia.

However, when I was asked by the Minority Leader to serve on the committee I felt obligated to do so—and to do so to the best of my ability—while still recognizing the inherent shortcomings in any such effort.

It was a challenging assignment, and turned out to be a fascinating and personally valuable experience—an experience which much after the nature of my own military service in World War II, I would not want to have missed but would not particularly care to repeat.

Each member of the Committee, I believe, it can be said, entered upon his duties in as objective a manner as possible; being willing to work, and to work hard, at those duties, and being hopeful, as well, that despite all the ambiguities and contradictions we knew we were to encounter we might still return with something of value to report to the House, and to the Nation.

I am proud of the way our committee—and all of its members—worked at our assignment. Our Chairman, "Sonny" Montgomery, was a tireless, but fair leader; and each individual Committee member had a free hand to do or suggest, whatever he felt might be an effective means by which to advance our overall efforts. To a large extent, then, each of us charted his own course in Vietnam (and elsewhere in Southeast Asia)—sometimes singly and sometimes as a "team" member—fanning out so as to cover, in a way I believe no other such study commission has attempted, more aspects of the United States involvement in those areas than any of us had originally contemplated. We therefore have, individually and collectively, a uniquely large portfolio of notes and information that—though each of us might draw different conclusions therefrom—ought to be of considerable value to this House.

Also, by virtue of the method of operation we adopted, the information we have rests, in my judgment, on a sounder and more-objective basis for analysis than comparable information heretofore brought back by other such study commissions. This was possible because we deliberately avoided publicity which might hamper our attempts at fact-finding, and we also avoided situations whereby a stage might be set for us to find only such "facts" as someone desired us to have. On most occasions, then, our drop-ins on civilian and military personnel at American posts were just that: Drop-ins, with little or no advance notice. Similarly, we postponed the large, formal briefings such a group could inevitably expect—and also needed somewhere along the way—until after we had spent a good many hours out "in the field," so to speak, discussing matters with the subordinates of those higher-ups who would eventually brief us, and plumbing in a "one-on-one" basis for the personal opinions of diverse individuals, so

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that when those formal briefings came, there could be a real dialogue, rather than the usual "one-way street."

I thoroughly approved of this manner of operation, but criticism of our efforts, perhaps inevitable, has already come. One such critic has declared that we had "too many military briefings." Whether we did or not is a matter of opinion—but, in light of the fact that we are, as a Nation, deeply involved militarily in Vietnam and indirectly so in other parts of Southeast Asia, a substantial number of military briefings was unavoidable. In any event, as a glance at the listing of individual or "team" contacts made by the committee will show (which summary, I understand, will be made an appendix to this report in its final form), the military briefings were more than outnumbered by the contacts we developed on a more personal basis with a great number of individuals with dramatically divergent viewpoints.

But, however this may be, the larger problem we encountered—and the area in which I, for one, believe we are subject to valid criticism—was in attempting to convert our notes and our individual observations to suitable report form. In that connection, the report we have submitted is—I regret to say—woefully inadequate.

This is the fault of no one in particular. It lies, instead, in the decision of a majority of us—which decision I questioned—to try to put our "report" together on the return plane trip home. Our accumulated fatigue—both mental and physical—contributed to the obvious difficulties inherent in such a situation. At best, what we could have hoped to do—and what I believed we were attempting to do—was to work, again individually and as teams, at rough drafts of the various sections or titles to be included in our final report. It was my further understanding that these drafts were to be put together for us by our staff people over the weekend following our arrival back in Washington, and later taken up by us, meeting in regular committee fashion, to see if we could then put them in final—and proper—report form. Instead of that, the so-called final "report" was filed for us on Monday afternoon, July 6th. At that time, so far as I know, few if any members of the committee other than the Chairman had seen the "report" in its entirety.

It is therefore inaccurate to state—I again regret to say—as is stated in the introduction to the report as filed, that it "... represents a consensus of the views of the committee."

At best, under the circumstances, the report can represent only a rough consensus of the views of some of the members of the committee.

I regret this because our failure to reach for a broader consensus among ourselves can only frustrate our desire to be of substantial service to our colleagues. Perhaps, such a consensus would have been impossible to attain in any event, but we ought at least to have tried since any report of this nature automatically loses much of its effectiveness when it is accompanied by a plethora of individual or supplemental views such as these. I now feel constrained to add to it:

THE ECONOMY OF SOUTH VIETNAM

In general, I approve of the matters and conclusions as set forth in the report under this heading.

Several times, different sources advised us that, in their opinion, the urgent economic problems faced by the government of South Vietnam constituted a far greater danger to its survival than any current military threat.

This economic crisis—centered around galloping inflation—has its greatest impact in Saigon and the other urban areas of South Vietnam. In the "countryside", many day-to-day transactions are conducted by traditional methods of barter, rather than for cash, and "black-market" operations of the sort so prevalent in and around Saigon are rare.

This contrast points out an important distinction: In considering the overall problems of South Vietnam, it is quite readily apparent that Saigon is one part thereof, and the "countryside" quite another.

It is possible that our committee spent too much time examining the problems of the "countryside," and too little attempting to understand the true nature of Saigon's internal difficulties, many of which relate back to the overwhelming presence the United States has so long maintained there. Our authorities in Saigon are wisely attempting to gradually reduce that "presence," and committee members who had been to South Vietnam before commented favorably on the vastly reduced numbers of American "GI's" seen nowadays on Saigon's streets. In another section of our committee's report—on which I shall have no further comment—it is suggested that American civilian personnel (including the personnel of contractors) in South Vietnam should also be reduced. Since most of these American civilians are in and around Saigon, again, and the numbers of them are all too apparent, I heartily concur in that recommendation.

In any event, before I left for Vietnam one of our other colleagues, not named as a member of our committee but a fairly recent visitor himself to Vietnam, asked me to inquire as to whether or not it was possible that, under existing programs, the present government of South Vietnam might "win" the countryside while "losing" Saigon. It would now be my observation that this is altogether possible, given the rather apparent success of the pacification programs in the rural areas alongside the growing dissatisfactions and political unrest now capturing daily headlines in Saigon's newspapers. But I left Saigon with the definite impression that the Thieu-Ky government has decided to take a calculated risk in this connection—giving priority, wisely or no, to an acceleration of the more rural-oriented pacification programs, while hoping in the meantime to ride out the gathering political storms centered in Saigon and the nation's lesser metropolitan areas.

I would consider this to involve a rather substantial risk—and, certainly, not one that we should discount in attempting to look at South Vietnam's immediate political future. For the fact must be stated plainly: South Vietnam's economic problems, and the social unrest caused thereby, are already severe and getting worse. Furthermore, those problems cannot help but be accentuated by the gradual American withdrawal. Strong measures need to be taken by the Thieu regime if these aggravated conditions are to be mastered, and Ambassador Bunker and his staff need to work as cooperatively as possible with that government—or its successor government—to ease the economic pains of our withdrawal. It will not be easy, and I am not particularly sanguine about South Vietnam's ability to find its way through to a state of "economic health," as our report puts it—but I am not prepared to say it cannot be done.

PACIFICATION

As a member of the select committee, I was particularly interested in this subject; I worked on this section of the report as filed and, since most of what I submitted in this regard was accepted by the other members, only a few additional comments are now needed.

I would like to preface those by saying that one of the more-productive days I spent in Vietnam was when John Paul Vann, DEPCORDS in the IV Corps (the Delta) section of South Vietnam, allowed me to accompany him on a routine inspection trip by automobile—and without military escort—from Can Tho, where we had spent the previous night, down Route 4 some 160 miles to the little city of Ca Mau, in An Xuyen Province.

Vann is an extremely interesting and knowledgeable man—regarded by some as the "Billy Mitchell" of the Vietnam war, for it was he who resigned his army commission some years ago to protest the Army's strategy of trying to fight a war of insurgency with a sledgehammer instead of a scalpel, only to return to Vietnam to take an active role in shaping the "pacification" program. As we drove down Route 4, he spoke at length of the Delta's war history. According to Vann, 2 million of the Delta's 7 million people were under VC control 2 years ago, as compared to only an estimated 167,000 now. Even a year ago, no American in his right mind would have attempted the trip we were making, even in daytime, without a heavy armed guard. Vann himself was ambushed and wounded by the VC while travelling by motor-bike down Route 4 only nine months ago. Matters have steadily improved until now—as I saw with my own eyes—most of the residents of the Delta were living quite normal lives.

This progress towards securing the countryside is all the more remarkable because of the fact that "Vietnamization"—pacification's corollary—is virtually complete in the Delta, our ground combat forces having been pulled out of action there nearly a year ago. Some 23,000 U.S. military personnel still remain in the Delta—once the heartland of the Communists' entire efforts to take over the country—but they are performing strictly a support and logistical function. With Vann, I stopped at several local units of CORDS (Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support)—as we moved freely in and out of small cities and villages, as well as provincial capitals, along the way. I made a point of talking with as many of the military and civilian "advisers" in these units as possible on a "one-on-one" basis—out of Vann's hearing—and was impressed (as I was at numerous similar stops on subsequent days in other part of South Vietnam) with their sense of dedication to, and satisfaction with, the job they were performing. I particularly recall a young second lieutenant with whom I talked in one small district town (in Bac Lieu Province, I believe) who, when asked by me if he thought the pacification program was worthwhile and had a chance of success, replied, "Yes, Sir; very much so. We're making peace here, Sir—not war."

Perhaps we are, finally, "making peace" in South Vietnam in this fashion. Surely, this shift away from a "body-count" objective and towards the objective of trying to win the "hearts and minds" of the countryside's residents—through the several facets of the pacification program—is a far sounder policy than the "big war" strategy we once pursued, with its inherent if unspoken concept of somehow thereby winning a "military victory" in and for South Vietnam.

However, whether or not "peace through pacification" is an attainable goal or just another illusion among the many from which we have suffered throughout our tragic experiences in South Vietnam, is still largely an unanswerable question. I tend to think, now, that—given enough time, and given the full support of the South Vietnamese government as well as of its people—a peace of sorts can be brought in this fashion to the people of South Vietnam.

But it will take additional time—and will cost additional lives—and perhaps more patience on the part of the American people than a majority of us are willing to give to the difficult task of trying to put back together a little nation that we have come close to destroying in our former attempt at "saving" it.

Pacification rests on a tenuous foundation, of course, but on a sounder one than we have previously attempted; a program whose level of success will, by any system of

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measurement, continue to go up and down since we still face a highly-mercurial situation in Vietnam. But it is also a program that—should the presently-favorable climate for it in Vietnam somehow hold—just might succeed.

VIETNAMIZATION

But pacification is only half of our policy for disengagement from the conflict in Vietnam—the other half being “Vietnamization.”

For someone who believes as I have for some time, that we have done just about all we can, militarily speaking, for the people of South Vietnam in their long struggle for self-determination—and for someone who believes, as I also have for some time, that we should now leave them to their own devices and determination, and in-depth study of our progress at “Vietnamization” of the sort we attempted could only produce mixed emotions, at best.

As the committee report suggests, that process is certainly “progressing” and it would appear that, as the report also states, “. . . all levels of our military command are planning to meet (the currently-announced) withdrawal schedules.”

The committee did not seek a consensus—which might have been impossible to achieve—as to whether or not the Vietnamization process could, and should, be accelerated. Instead, it contented itself, in the report, with merely noting that: “As far as ground troops are concerned, America should continue its withdrawal program at least as fast as is now scheduled.”

At the risk of putting words in others' mouths, I believe that several of us, left Vietnam convinced that this withdrawal program, at least in the area of ground combat, could and should be accelerated. I, for one, fall into that category. There is no question in my mind but that the military situation in South Vietnam today is better for both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese than as any time since American units first entered the war in the summer of 1965. In addition, the South Vietnamese fighting units have undoubtedly gained new self-confidence as a result of their role in the Cambodian-sanctuary operation. The only thing that would appear to prevent us from capitalizing on these facts is the new uncertainty brought into the picture by the external threat now to Cambodia, itself. Irrespective of this uncertainty, however, I believe it would be useful for purposes of encouraging the South Vietnamese people, and particularly their political community to finally pull themselves together, if we were to announce as soon as practicable further troop reductions beyond those already now scheduled to take place before next May 1st.

There is a risk in this, of course, just as there has always been with regard to our decision to withdraw from combat and turn this war over to those who alone—albeit with our logistical help—can win it. But I think we should certainly aim more precisely at being out of all ground combat (except insofar as remaining U.S. units might have to defend themselves) within a year from now; and I also think that we should aim to phase out the balance of our military support activities, except perhaps for a residual group of advisers and logistical aides, within two years from now, rather than the three or four years some of our military people projected for us.

In this connection, I was especially impressed with our Navy's procedures for turning their “in-country” mission over to the South Vietnamese navy. These procedures are described in the report under this title. Admittedly, the Navy may have faced an easier Vietnamization problem than either the Army or the Air Force, but the Navy's program is now 80 percent complete and will be fully completed by December of this year.

with the exception of larger combat ships and the completion of training of SVN navy personnel to take over maintenance and operational procedures. Navy, thus, is now nearly out of the “combat business” in Vietnam, as evidence of which stands that fact that only some 20 percent of the over 225 assault craft taking part in the Mekong portion of the recent Cambodian operation were USN vessels. Surely, there is something here that both our Army and Air Force people might endeavor to copy.

There are still other ways by which the process of Vietnamization could, I think, be accelerated. One of the things I shall always remember about my ride down Route 4 to Ca Mau is seeing U.S. Army Engineer units, and personnel, working on repairing and rebuilding portions of that heavily-travelled highway in the noon-day heat and humidity while South Vietnamese natives lay in their hammocks—during their customary “siesta” time—on the front porches of their homes along that road. There are many paradoxical things about this war that future historians will puzzle over—including the fact that we were drafting young Americans to fight and die in it long before the nation we sought to help had instituted its own system of military conscription. But it is equally paradoxical for us to draft young Americans to spend a year of their lives in Vietnam working with pick, shovel and rake at building roads for the South Vietnamese—who are by no means a lazy people. I can well understand why our Engineers cannot turn heavy road-building machinery, complicated to operate, over to untrained South Vietnamese. But there is no reason why we cannot hire South Vietnamese, who need the jobs anyway, to take over the manual labor that our people—here and elsewhere in Vietnam—are doing, and thus reduce our need for continuing to send draftees to work, if not to fight, in Vietnam.

One final word about the Vietnamization process: It could well be that we have so “Americanized” the South Vietnamese Army that it cannot, at any foreseeable time, be maintained by the people of South Vietnam. The question needs to be asked: “Have we so re-made ARVN in our own Army's capable but elephantine image, with its long logistical tail and its expensive array of equipment, as to make it impossible for the South Vietnamese to carry on ‘their’ war, if need be, in a way compatible with Vietnamese capabilities and resources?”

The question is worth pondering, and it is one that deeply concerns the responsible senior staff officers of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff with whom I talked. They realize they simply cannot afford to continue to fight, after we have gone, in the same ways we have, even with such material and economic assistance as they hope we may still provide.

Unless, then, we are prepared to commit ourselves to a support function in South Vietnam longer than I think we are, and if disengagement on our part is intended to be something more than a simple abandonment of the responsibilities we assumed, wisely or not, for South Vietnam, some redefinition of “Vietnamization” along these lines ought to be attempted.

It would also be helpful for us to better understand the Vietnamese attitude towards this program. As best I could determine, most of them accept it as being both inevitable and irreversible. But several of them reminded me that, while the program portends the end of the war for us, it also assumes that “their” war will go on.

So, in trying to decide if “Vietnamization” has a good chance of success as “Pacification” now seems to have, we ought also to attempt some broader redefinition of what we really mean by “Vietnamization.”

The most disturbing finding of all I made in Vietnam was the fact that both sides now

seem to be digging in for a protracted war—and I think all will agree that the Vietnamese, both North and South, have for far too long suffered under the burden of war.

Can we call “Vietnamization” a success if, in the end, it merely prolongs that suffering?

Personally, I do not think so—and this is why I asked President Thieu, when we had our audience with him, if he did not think it was time to make some “new initiatives” towards peace. His reply was the more or less standard one to the effect that his government was ready to negotiate with the other side, on anything, at anytime, but that all such overtures thus far made have fallen on deaf ears. Since that time, Secretary of State Rogers has had his own audience with President Thieu, and President Nixon has named David K. E. Bruce to head the United States delegation at the near-comatose Paris peace talks. What all this may portend, no one can say, but one of the more-interesting discussions I had in Saigon was with Mr. Tran Van Tuyen, a local attorney, a member of the Vietnamese delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference and later a 3-year political prisoner under the Diem regime, who told me: “If ‘Vietnamization’ is only a war strategy and not at the same time a peace-seeking method, it is also a myth among the many that have marked the American involvement in Vietnam, and the biggest myth of all.”

CAMBODIA

The committee report comments at length on the overall Cambodian situation, but in very general terms, and refers but briefly to “the evident success of the sanctuary clearing operation”—something which I believe individual committee members have separately termed an “outstanding success.”

For my part, I am perfectly willing to accept as fact the committee's conclusion that the sanctuary operation was, strictly speaking, a “success.” Surely, it has bought time within which both the Pacification and Vietnamization programs can go forward and, almost equally surely, it will result in substantial savings in American lives. This latter thought was uppermost in the minds of those American boys who took part in this operation as I discussed it with them at two different locations just inside the Cambodian border. None of them, it deserves to be noted, had any doubts about the necessity and justification for the effort they were making.

I did not expect to find otherwise, but this is as good a point as any to make one other observation: Whether this war is right or wrong for the United States, and regardless of the concerns so often expressed at home these days about the motivation and moral fibre of our younger generation, this war will stand as a testament to the fortitude and courage of those young Americans who have fought in it. They have done so often against their wishes, and yet they have been willing to perform to the best of their ability whatever mean, difficult and dangerous task we assigned to them—in the face of vast uncertainties at home about their mission.

Through their sacrifices, we have learned (or should have learned) in Vietnam some lessons about revolutionary warfare and about the limitations of our own power. One can accept the Cambodian-sanctuary operation as being consistent with what we have thus learned, and one can welcome its short-term military benefits; but, at the same time, we need to understand that those benefits which may now permit us a faster rate of disengagement from Vietnam have also unintentionally created a climate in Cambodia, itself, that could lead to an even-greater involvement on our part in the tangled affairs of Southeast Asia.

The Cambodian situation, when we looked at it, was too fluid a one for immediate prescription. All of us who visited Phnom Penh came away filled with concern for Cambodia's future, and with feelings of deep sympathy

for the Cambodian people. I am sure we all wanted to help them in some way—and I believe we should, to a limited extent. But, if the lessons so dearly bought for us in Vietnam are to mean anything, we must remember that we cannot go on trying to prop up government unable to defend themselves, or people unwilling to fight for their own freedoms; and we must try to keep Cambodia in proper perspective by recognizing the fact that we have nothing remotely resembling a "vital" interest in its future except insofar as keeping it out of enemy hands serves our purposes in Vietnam.

If this sounds unduly harsh, I regret it—but relief for the beleaguered Cambodians must come from some other source than direct U.S. assistance. It was to drive that point home that some of us talked with Dr. Thanat Khoman, Thailand's distinguished Foreign Minister, at Bangkok, while others of us flew to Jakarta and Singapore to pursue—as the United States must pursue—whatever possibility for restoring peace and security to Cambodia may yet come from the so-called "Jakarta Conference" of last May 16th and 17th. In neither instance could we find reason for optimism—a subject on which I understand the Hon. Hastings Keith (a member of our committee) is submitting separate views in which I express my interest.

There are numerous other matters to which I would also like to address myself, including the findings made by two members of our committee at the Con Son Island prison—which matter has since become one of unfortunate controversy. But I have sought to confine myself, in these supplementary remarks, to the main factors as I saw them that help define our current situation in Southeast Asia and, however dimly, our future there.

Since my return from this extended inspection trip, I have often been asked if anything I heard or saw during its course had caused me to change my views.

The answer—as best I can find one—is "No," though in saying that I recognize full well that most of us now only see Vietnam through more or less thick veils of preconceived ideas that tend to obscure the true facts for us.

Besides which, at the "press-conference-in-reverse" we had with American newsmen in Saigon, one of them said a "fact-finding" commission such as ours could find in Vietnam whatever "facts" it wanted to confirm whatever it already believed.

I suspect that is true. I have tried to guard against any such tendency, and I now submit these views to my colleagues for such value as they may have to them, with the assurance that they are objective as I can make them.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROBISON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I have listened avidly to the gentleman's dissertation. I have read every word of the report by the committee of which the gentleman was a member. I had a special interest because I led a group of independent observers two and a half years ago to Vietnam, and we came back and made a report to the President, then President Johnson, and to the Congress. We have continued our interest in this problem. We have returned and we are about ready to make our report to the President, who asked us to return and make evaluations and comparisons, which we will do.

I want to say, Mr. Speaker, that the findings of this committee largely confirm what we have found and altogether reflect the deep concern on our part, and

I think we are reflecting the concerns of our people.

Here again, we have heard a very fine presentation of the problem as the distinguished gentleman from New York has seen it.

In our report we will point out once again the lack of policy in Vietnam, the lack of understanding of what is our true objective over there. To use a paraphrase from an old friend of mine that I worship in history, who once was President, Abe Lincoln, "My policy seems to be to have no policy." That seemed to serve that interest he was thinking of, but it does not serve this interest.

One of our problems in Vietnam is that we have no real policy. We can find in the record some 13 different reasons why we are there; pronouncements by the State Department, and by former Presidents, and the current President. We will make a special note of this and call for an enunciation of a policy, and we will suggest one.

We will also deal with some pluses over there, and I am sure the gentleman saw them. In the field of education, especially the first five grades, we were thrilled to find out that the average daily attendance of the boys and girls in school, who were in the age groups in grades one through five, has increased from 400,000 to 2,300,000. That is a magnificent contribution to education.

The quality of that education was not equal to what it could have been, and should be, and eventually will be. I think they are working on this question of qualification, but we seem to have fallen off in that and have not followed through sufficiently with the high school program or institutions of higher learning.

We will make a special note of the fact that we lack emphasis greatly in the field of agriculture. Out of South Vietnam's population, 70 percent are identified with farming, but there are only 406 students taking agriculture in colleges.

There is a woeful lack there.

We will report a plus where we have moved in with extension services, with some people from Iowa, and many States in the union, doing magnificent work there to help the people improve their farming techniques, and the use of fertilizers, and the improvement of procedures. The use of new varieties of rice in some instances can quadruple production. All these are pluses.

We noted with regret that the Thieu government is pulling back on this program.

We think this is unfortunate.

We noted pacification. I believe this area of pacification is the real answer to the problem over there. I was glad to hear the gentleman say this. Our feeling was that this name was unfortunate. It was not accepted by the Vietnamese. Somehow or other, we still use it. We are going to suggest a substitute title, that it is a program to bring stability, security, and progress to these people, who need this most of all.

I believe that we need to increase our involvement here in Congress, and the concerns of the gentleman from New York and the chairman of his committee, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr.

MONTGOMERY) and all the others of this team, that took them beyond the call of duty in their work there has made a magnificent contribution to a better understanding of this problem.

We cannot solve the basic problems unless we have a better understanding of them. I commend the gentleman for his insight.

I assure the gentleman I will consider very seriously the resolution to which he has referred. It has some pertinent "whereas" clauses which ought to be considered and which zero in on the problem.

Again I commend the gentleman.

(Mr. SCHWENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROBISON. I appreciate the complimentary remarks of the distinguished gentleman from Iowa. I know he has been deeply concerned with this whole issue and with the need to develop a clearer United States policy with respect to our future in Southeast Asia. I am sure we all look forward to the report that he and his colleagues will present to us on their separate trip to Southeast Asia.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROBISON. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, the leader of our select committee and one of the finest leaders I have ever known.

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his very kind remarks. I might say that, as chairman of this select committee, one of the great pleasures I had was having the gentleman in the well on our committee. He is a dedicated person. He has a certain type of wit about him which makes it very easy to work with the gentleman. He has the ability to express himself.

Mr. Speaker, he has the ability to express himself in writing, and he had a lot to do with the writing of our report.

I might say that the remarks of the gentleman today were outstanding. I hope the Members who were not present here will have the opportunity to read this special order in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The gentleman pointed out that our findings at Con Son Prison, where there are the so-called "tiger cages," have perhaps overshadowed our report, and that other parts of the report were overlooked. This is certainly true.

It is rather sad that this would happen; that one part of the trip would overshadow other parts of the trip. I hope the Members, and the press, and the people of this country will look at the rest of the report, for Members such as the gentleman in the well exposed themselves day after day to the dangers of Vietnam and the other countries of Southeast Asia to try to bring back a constructive, valuable report.

I might say to the gentleman in the well, as he stated in his supplemental remarks in the report which we submitted to the Speaker and to the Mem-

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bers of Congress, that probably the report was submitted too quickly, and that Members of this Select Committee did not have the opportunity to look at the report before it was filed.

The gentleman is absolutely right in what he said. I take the responsibility. For some reason, Mr. Speaker, I felt that, as soon as we got back, this report should be submitted to the House of Representatives, because it would become old if one waited too long.

I am not looking for any comment from the gentleman, but I really accept the responsibility. I believe it would have been a better report if I had waited until we could have had all the Members look at the report. However, there was a driving force, and, I felt we had to submit it as soon as possible.

As the gentleman knows, and the other gentlemen know who were on the committee, we did begin work on the report as soon as we boarded the airplane. We worked on it for 2 days before we came back to the United States. But I wish we had taken the gentleman's advice and delayed the report.

Mr. ROBISON. If the gentleman will permit at this point, as I am sure he knows I intended no criticism of the distinguished chairman in making a reference to the haste with which the report was filed in my supplemental views. The circumstances surrounding our return, and the fact that this was the 4th of July weekend and, as the gentleman from Mississippi was well aware, as soon as we arrived back in Washington we were all going to go to the four corners of this Nation and he might not see us again for 3 or 4 days, and then with the interest of the news media in what we had to say, along with his inability to sit on our tentative conclusions for 3 or 4 days, that these are all circumstances that I understand full well, I tell my friend. I think, though, if we could have had different circumstances in which to take time to try for a broader consensus, we might have found it in several areas.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I appreciate the gentleman's comments. I think probably other committee chairmen could learn from the experience I had as a committee chairman in our work as a committee. It was really a much harder trip than I had anticipated. I think the decisions that were made, with the approval of the committee, and the proposals that I recommended to them were basically sound for the first 10 or 12 days. However, after that Mr. Speaker, you become tired and you board the airplane and come back. So, probably, I would recommend to other committee chairmen that they not be too hasty in issuing their report to the Congress, but to take perhaps a week's time before they submit it. I am glad that the gentleman brought up this special order. There is a tendency in the Congress, and in the leadership, perhaps, as well as in the people in this country to overlook the war in Vietnam, but it surely is not going to go away. We have to face this issue, and we think in our report we have given some basic information necessary to help us face up to it.

Mr. Speaker, I will move along, because I know that there are other Members who wish to comment. We can all learn something from our committee. We probably stayed longer in Southeast Asia than any other type of congressional committee.

Mr. ROBISON. We also probably worked harder than any other congressional committee that ever visited that part of the world.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I think so. I think when you stay only 3 or 4 days in a country such as South Vietnam where we are deeply involved that that is just not enough time. You need at least 10 days in a country like South Vietnam.

I also want to mention that when we broke up into teams, this was a worthwhile experiment. Mr. Speaker, our 12 Members did not go around as one unit. We broke up into teams, and covered much of Southeast Asia. Mainly we covered South Vietnam. Then we sent one team to check on another team. I think it worked rather well, and I hope that other committees will look at what we did. This is all in our report.

I would caution such "select committees" in the future to be careful in picking staff members. Spend a lot of time on that. It is very, very important. If you do not select the proper staff people, you might become involved where you should not be involved. When you work as hard as we did the people should get the facts from the members of the committee and not from a staff member, who is seeking his own ends, and his own gain.

I am sorry the gentleman did not refer our military's problems regarding narcotics and marihuana as described in the report. The gentleman worked very hard on that. I know in the report we said that 30 percent of the American servicemen in Southeast Asia or who are in South Vietnam, at one time or another have participated in the smoking of marihuana and the use of narcotics. We spelled it out, and this is very important.

Mr. ROBISON. If the gentleman will permit, that was only an estimate, because no one has any very good figures on this. No statistical studies have been made. However, I think it is fair to say that about 30 percent of our U.S. servicemen in Vietnam have, at least, experimented with marijuana or some other drug, and that this is about as close as one could come to the probable facts.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, moving to Cambodia, I think it was the consensus of the committee—I would say nine or 10 of the 12 members agreed—that, certainly, we did not need to send any ground troops into Cambodia, but that military aid and financial assistance would certainly help.

In closing, I would say I have not had the proper opportunity to study the gentleman's resolution, but I have found his work to be thoroughly thought out, and I hope to have an opportunity to study and take a real hard look at the resolution that the gentleman is submitting.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and I especially appre-

ciate the gentleman taking this special order.

Mr. ROBISON. I thank you very much Chairman MONTGOMERY. It was a pleasure to have been able to participate in this effort and, as I stated earlier, no one could expect to have a finer leader than you. Further, though I do not particularly hanker for another trip to South Vietnam, if we do go, I would just as soon have you lead us again.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROBISON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

(Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I am impelled to note that the discussion today, as the gentleman in the well says, points out a very great problem between the executive branch and the Congress of the United States, in that the Commander in Chief has control over the Armed Forces of the United States, and that we cannot impose our tactical or strategic decisions upon him. But, on the other hand, we have the major responsibility, a constitutional responsibility, to fund the standing Army of the United States, and to face our constituents every 2 years to justify that funding.

With respect to the gentleman in the well—can all our ground combat troops, in effect, be out of action by May 1, 1971, and all other troops out of Southeast Asia by July 1, 1972? I would anticipate that this rate of withdrawal differs from the President's plan of withdrawal, though it is consistent with some of the comments in the supplementary views to the committee report to the effect that withdrawal might be accelerated at a faster rate than now being conducted?

In looking back at the program that the President has followed, it seems, in the first year since he declared a policy of withdrawal in May of 1969, that he withdrew approximately one-fifth of the 549,500 troops in South Vietnam that were authorized at that time by withdrawing 115,000 from Vietnam by the month of March 1970, and indicating that he would withdraw an additional 150,000 by May of 1971. This would leave approximately 284,500 men in Vietnam by May 1 of next year.

I want to ask the gentleman in the well; if we were to withdraw all ground combat troops from Vietnam by May 1, 1971, if the gentleman could indicate, approximately, what are the numbers of men involved in addition to the 150,000 that the President has announced that he will withdraw?

Mr. ROBISON. Well, to attempt an answer to that would require deeper research, I believe, than our select committee completed during the course of our investigation.

But, it is my understanding—and I stand to be corrected on this—that, once the 150,000 additional troops which the President has proposed be brought out between now and next May 1 are out, we would have about 85 percent of all our ground combat troops out of Vietnam.

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I think this is the intention behind President Nixon's promised additional withdrawal. Does the gentleman have a different interpretation?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. No, I have not tried to interpret the announcement of the President, but it seems to me that, in a checkup of our strength in Vietnam, approximately one-fifth of our troops were included in the so-called maneuver battalions, the "striking forces," and the carrying on of combat against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, or about a four-to-one ratio of support troops to combat troops, so I have used the figure of approximately 110,000 combat troops as opposed to 440,000 support troops. And, in the first withdrawal of the President—the 115,000 troops—there was a far greater ratio of combat to support troops. So, it seems highly possible to me that the President's plan in withdrawing most of the combat troops by May of 1971—

Mr. ROBISON. If the gentleman will yield there, there are some logical reasons behind this, of course; centered, largely, around the fact that the training of South Vietnamese to replace our servicemen in artillery support, or in air support, and these kinds of efforts, are matters that require additional training time.

You can replace a ground combat soldier much more easily, and much more quickly, than you can train helicopter pilots. I think this is part of the President's problem and our problem in trying to arrive at how many of our servicemen we can get out in a year or two from now.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Let me ask the second question, if I may:

Based on the reports we have had from the Committee on Appropriations, and the Secretary of Defense, it was my understanding that we estimated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, that that budget included about \$30 billion expended in Vietnam. The following year that ended just recently, June 30, 1970, we had an estimate of \$33 billion in Vietnam, and for the present fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, the estimate has been that approximately \$17 billion would be expended in Vietnam, which would give some indication that if the withdrawal of 115,000 men—with roughly 50 percent combat troops—did reduce the budget by some \$7 billion, then the reduction of another 150,000 this year would produce a further reduction of an additional \$6 billion.

I am wondering, since we face the defense appropriation bill coming before us in the next 30 or 60 days, if the gentleman in the well has any indication, or estimate, as to how much this year's budget might be reduced if we were willing to accelerate the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam as the gentleman proposes during this fiscal year.

Mr. ROBISON. My resolution, I might say to the gentleman, does not address itself to numbers at the moment now. It addresses itself to bringing out, first, our ground combat troops, as I have mentioned, and then bringing out all other combat or combat-support troops by July 1, of 1972.

The fiscal year the gentleman is asking about, I take it, is the current fiscal year, the one that ends June 30 of next year. If we are only going to accelerate the withdrawal of a few more ground combat soldiers during the balance of that fiscal year, I doubt that the financial impact on the 1971 budget would be very great. But, in the ensuing fiscal year, if we could so encourage the President and if we could, in fact, accelerate the withdrawal of our other combat-support troops from Vietnam, it would seem clear to me that the effect on that fiscal year's budget would be quite substantial.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. If I might ask one or two other questions; the essence of the gentleman's conclusion, if we were to assume that the President withdraws over 265,000 men during the first 2 years and, yet, leaves 284,000 men in Vietnam as of May of 1971, if this were to be accelerated so that all of our troops would be out, in essence, in 2 years rather than what would appear to be about 4 years under the President's program, this would indicate that the missions of Vietnamization and pacification, in the gentleman's opinion, could be accomplished just as easily in 2 years as in 4 years?

In the committee's consideration of what those tasks are—for American troops in Vietnam today—there is, first, the training of the South Vietnamese, with the recognition that we have been training South Vietnamese since 1960 and that, presumably as a result of the Cambodian operation and the increased morale and experiences of the South Vietnamese, we would finish their training just as easily next year as we could in the ensuing 3 years; is that a correct assumption?

Mr. ROBISON. Is it basically a correct assumption, although I do not know if anyone has addressed himself to the long-range problem of what kind of air support the South Vietnamese might need if they are going to survive as an independent and free society.

I do not think anyone has ever expressed any intention, on behalf of the U.S. Government, to train South Vietnamese pilots, or to give the Government of South Vietnam long-range bombers such as those that we have used, let us say, in the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or portions thereof.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. If the gentleman could comment on this—from conversations with the gentleman and other members of the committee, it is my understanding, so far as combat-infantry training and artillery training of the Vietnamese is concerned, that the Vietnamese have reached such a point of competence that we would feel it is safe to leave them to their own training programs and such combat readiness as they have thus far achieved?

Mr. ROBISON. I think so. Certainly, I think they have established a good deal more confidence in themselves by their showing of competence in the Cambodian operation.

I think we ought to dwell on this at the moment in order to encourage them now to take on more of the burden of com-

bat, and to do it far more rapidly than they now seem to be prepared to do.

I remember one American newsman, Keyes Beech, who has been in Saigon a long time, telling us that he had been a "hawk" from the beginning, with respect to Vietnam, but that now he felt that the Vietnamization program ought to be accelerated. In his words, it was time to "get a little nasty" with the people of South Vietnam—the point being, I think, that we need to encourage them to "pull up their socks," so to speak, and to begin to "swim"—as we think now they are ready to swim on their own.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. To go to the matter of communications and logistics training—does the gentleman in the well, or anyone on the committee, have any indication of how long American troop-training capacity may have to remain in Vietnam in order to bring the South Vietnamese to a level of communication and logistical capacity to conduct the war without an American troop presence?

Mr. ROBISON. I think the gentleman is getting into an area in which I am not personally competent to respond.

Perhaps my friend, the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. HANSEN), or the chairman of our committee wishes to comment on this.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I do not really think such a time has been set by the American forces, logistically, or for the Air Force—either one.

However, I would state to the gentleman from California that I was greatly impressed with the advances, not only that the ARVN troops had made, but also by the Air Force of South Vietnam. This was my fourth trip over there.

I think, probably, we are underestimating the time that we can bring Americans out of South Vietnam. However, I do not see any time when we can be able to bring Americans out completely. I think, probably, we will have to provide some type of logistical and technical advice for some time to come in South Vietnam.

I am probably not giving the gentleman a definite answer to his question, but I would certainly say that in less than 4 years, and somewhere between 2 and 3 years that the South Vietnamese Air Force could be capable of taking over all combat operations—and the ARVN forces in less than 2 years.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the distinguished chairman of the committee and also the gentleman now in the well.

I think the committee, in its report, has well justified our investment of time and funds in making this particular investigation.

I have been struck by the fact that the Congress of the United States does owe its constituency an intelligent evaluation as to how our money is being spent on defense, today, and particularly in Vietnam.

I think the report of the committee throws a good deal of light on the deliberations that we will undertake next month, and perhaps the following month.

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on the allocation of further moneys to Vietnam.

This brings me to the last question to the gentleman: There has been mention, in the committee report, of the need to replace our diminishing military presence with increased financial assistance in order that the South Vietnamese Government may, hopefully, handle its domestic economy and problems. I note that, in the pacification program last year, to 10,000 or more villages in South Vietnam we paid the equivalent of about \$10,000, or slightly less than that, to each village which would conduct its own civilian government—which is a major injection of U.S. funds into the civilian economy of Vietnam.

I am wondering if the gentleman, or the committee in its deliberations, reached any conclusions as to when the last American troops are withdrawn, what the level of American economic assistance should be; whether it is in the \$3- or \$4-billion-a-year level, or just what that sum might be?

Mr. ROBISON. The gentleman is asking a series of questions that point up, I believe, one fallacy of Vietnamization as a policy, if that is the only policy we are to have. The gentleman has been asking me—What is Vietnam going to cost us in the future? How many men will we need there? How much support will we have to give South Vietnam in future years?

The main thrust of my remarks, earlier, and also the thrust of my comments with regard to Vietnamization in my supplementary views, was to the effect that Vietnamization, standing by itself, is not a very good policy unless we are prepared, as I think the gentleman would agree, to go on for years watching the people of Vietnam continue to quarrel and to fight among themselves, and unless we are also prepared to go on giving substantial military and economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam; if it is to continue to be an independent nation, so that they can continue to carry on this particular conflict.

What I think is really needed, and what the thrust of our policy should be—and our primary objective should be—is to produce a just peace through a negotiated settlement. Then the burden of our continuing assistance to South Vietnam would be, I should think, in the economic areas; in trying to help them rebuild their nation that we have come so perilously close to destroying.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Let me ask this question. I agree with everything the gentleman has said, both in his report and here today on the floor. But how can we expect the North Vietnamese to be willing to negotiate a just peace at the same time as we accelerate our withdrawal from that country?

Mr. ROBISON. It seems to me that there are conditions prevailing in South Vietnam, and in their divided political structure, which could be improved upon if we could only convince the people of South Vietnam that we were, indeed, prepared to go home; that we were going home by a rather certain date, much closer than they presently anticipate is to be that date; and that, out of this, would come some social and political re-

forms and, thus, some additional strength to South Vietnam; then, as the people from the North watched this develop, over the next year or so, it might encourage them to seek a settlement of this long-standing dispute because, otherwise, they are going to face a failure, I think, of their intention to take over in the South.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. If I understand the gentleman correctly, it is implicit in what the gentleman has said that, as the U.S. presence diminishes, and the South Vietnamese will to fight and to reach a just peace on its own part increases, as of necessity they must, as we withdraw—

Mr. ROBISON. As they get closer together politically, and economically, and give evidence that they will begin to solve their own internal problems—Yes.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Then it might impose a greater pressure on the North Vietnamese to make reasonable concessions than if we continue to fight this war, if we place the major burden of this war on the South Vietnamese.

Mr. ROBISON. That is about it.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Then I want to ask a final question which has been on the minds of many of us. Beyond the final withdrawal of American troops, what would be the American posture in the event the North Vietnamese are then unwilling to return, in good health, the American prisoners of war?

Mr. ROBISON. That is a very disturbing question to me, and one I long considered in preparing the language of my own resolution. Particularly, I pondered over whether or not I ought to attach proviso to the effect that we would not withdraw totally until all our prisoners of war had been safely returned to us; that is, that all of our men who are prisoners of war in the North had been returned to us.

I think, if the gentleman will permit, that this is a matter to which Congress has addressed itself at considerable length otherwise, and that the President is doing about all he can in this regard at the moment. I think we will have to find a solution to it before we come home, but to attach this to a policy of coming home would, I think, be a mistake.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would have to concur in that comment of the gentleman. When I first ran for the Congress about 3 years ago, I suggested that our policy should be withdrawal over a 2-year period of time, which is precisely the gentleman's proposal here today. It seems to me, however, with respect to our prisoners of war, that we cannot make as a condition of our withdrawal that the North Vietnamese return these prisoners of war, because this would be asking for a concession at the same time that the gentleman suggests there be a turning over of the resolution of Vietnam and its government and its war and its peace to its own people.

But I would like to offer for the consideration of the gentleman, and the House, the possibility that 30 days after the last American has withdrawn from Vietnam, we should make it very clear to the North Vietnamese, if our prisoners of war are not returned in good health, 30 days after withdrawal, we would then authorize the President of the

United States to take such action as may be necessary, and to use such weapons as he might choose, to obtain the release of our prisoners of war.

Mr. ROBISON. I thank the gentleman.

(Mr. HANSEN of Idaho (at the request of Mr. ROBISON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

[Mr. HANSEN of Idaho addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. GRAY) for 60 minutes.

[Mr. GRAY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT GUSTAVO DÍAZ ORDAZ OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DE LA GARZA), is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, on December 1 of this year, Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz will surrender the reins of government to newly elected chief of state Luis Echeverría Álvarez, and thus climax 6 years of devoted service to his nation. Today, I wish to take this opportunity to honor President Díaz Ordaz and to pay tribute to the outstanding contributions which he has made to his beloved Mexico.

The stature of the Mexican nation today must surely invoke pride in the hearts of her citizens. In the last four decades, Mexico has transformed itself from a nation languishing in abject poverty to one of the most rapidly progressing of all the developing countries—and this progress has been achieved against a background of both internal peace and independence. As Mexico begins the decade of the 1970's, she stands as a model for other nations in civic cohesion, economic progress and political stability. A visitor to this beautiful land cannot but sense the spirit of immense vitality, sense of purpose, and pride which pervades the Mexican atmosphere. President Díaz Ordaz must take great satisfaction in knowing that his efforts have contributed to the dynamic Mexico of 1970.

When Gustavo Díaz Ordaz became President in 1964, he pledged to sustain Mexico's continuing revolution, and to lend his efforts to the integral development of his nation—economically, socially, politically, and culturally. In particular, he pledged to work for the furtherance of agrarian reform, social welfare, and labor development, industrialization, education, and for the concept of democracy—which he has described as "working opportunities for all, an access to education for all, health for all of the people, bread for everyone, and a peaceful atmosphere, governed by liberty and justice, for all."

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In the economic sphere, the Diaz Ordaz government, guided by multiple objectives of combating inflation, encouraging a favorable trade balance, maintaining the stability of the peso, and accelerating economic development, directed its efforts toward creating within Mexico a mixed economy—a balance in all economic sectors between private and government initiative and domestic and foreign investment. Largely as a result of the economic and fiscal policies of his administration, Mexico today boasts the fastest growing economy south of the Rio Grande. GNP has reached \$30 billion annually and is climbing rapidly. Mexico's overall economic growth rate of 7 percent per year has annually been among the highest in Latin America. Today, the peso remains one of the world's soundest currencies, and the presence of extensive foreign private investment attests to world confidence in the Mexican economic atmosphere.

At the same time that President Diaz Ordaz has strived to maintain Mexico's economic upsurge, has not allowed that goal to obscure his profound concern for the living standards of the Mexican population. He has often stated that the economic progress which Mexico is experiencing is of minor importance unless the national wealth is fairly distributed throughout all sectors of the population and put to use to provide the poor with bread and shelter, social well-being, and educational opportunities. In his words:

The prosperity of one part of Mexico cannot be healthy if based on the poverty of another.

An area of critical economic concern in Mexico is the lagging agrarian sector. When President Diaz Ordaz took office, he announced that the greatest task of his administration would be that of improving the condition of the rural peasant. He put into effect an aggressive 20-point program dedicated to increasing agricultural productivity through improved farming techniques, intensified agricultural research, irrigation projects, increased mechanization, crop diversification, and major new infrastructure projects such as construction of rural feeder roads, water supply, and crop storage systems, and electrification. Additional government assistance was provided in the form of increased social security, agricultural insurance, and farm credits. In the area of rural social services, the administration provided for the construction of many new schools and public health centers. In addition, the rate of land redistribution was accelerated—during the 6 years of President Diaz Ordaz's term, more than 16 million hectares of land were distributed to 300,000 farm families. The President also instituted an innovative program of incentives to industries to encourage their location in overcrowded farm areas, thereby creating multiple new job opportunities in Mexico's most troubled areas.

Perhaps President Diaz Ordaz' greatest contribution to Mexico rests in the spirit of the man himself—in his great love for his people and in his profound respect for democracy and personal freedom. When he accepted the presidential

nomination in 1963, he pledged that his government would "protect and guarantee all liberties but one—the liberty of doing away with other liberties." During the 6 years of his term, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz kept his promise to the Mexican people, steering a political course which did not tolerate extremism from left to right, and insuring that the fundamental decisions of government evolved from a broad spectrum of political opinions. He once likened himself to a submarine on sonar:

When I am picking up noise from both the left and right, I know that my course is correct.

He endeavored to broaden democratic channels, enlisting popular interest and participation in political and governmental affairs, and encouraging the formation of responsible opposition parties.

At the same time, President Diaz Ordaz devoted himself to molding his people into a cohesive unit, dedicated to the development, progress, and social well-being of the nation. He spoke once of national unity in words which I believe are relevant to all men and all nations in these explosive times:

National unity is not the struggle of the men of the left to destroy the men of the right. National unity is not the eternal battle of two antagonistic principles. National unity is the sacrifice of our petty interests, the sacrifice of our passions. It is the waiving of our individual interests to give ourselves to a higher interest: the interest of the country.

I cannot end my salute to President Diaz Ordaz without paying special tribute to the man and to his countrymen for their role in hosting the XIX Olympic Games in October 1968. The Mexican nation must take deep satisfaction and legitimate pride in the outcome of their magnificent effort—this the first time the Games were held in a Spanish-speaking country, the first time in a Latin American nation, and the first time in a host country was chosen that was not among the economically fully developed nations. Sponsorship of the Games was indeed a challenge to Mexico's economic and technical capacities, and this challenge was met with honor, ability, efficiency, and creative imagination. The supreme effort of the Mexican people in bringing this ambitious undertaking to a successful conclusion brought Mexico international respect and recognition, and greatly enhanced her prestige around the world. In fulfilling their commitment, President Diaz Ordaz and the people of Mexico made a major contribution toward the goal of international friendship, human solidarity, and world peace.

Mr. Speaker and fellow Members of the House of Representatives, I hope that in this all too brief period of time, I have given you some insight into the greatness of the man who has served as President of Mexico for the last 6 years, and the variety of his accomplishments. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz—lawyer, judge, professor, politician, and statesman, has indeed served his nation and his fellow countrymen well. Under his guidance, the Mexican nation has continued to move forward in dynamic, creative, and peaceful progress.

Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues, per-

mit me to add a personal note about President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. He is a devoted husband, father, and grandfather. He is indeed a true friend to those who know him; he has a very warm and charming sense of wit which adds to the eloquence of his words.

Finally, one cannot speak of the accomplishments of President Diaz Ordaz without thinking of his gracious and very charming first lady, Dona Guadalupe Borja de Diaz Ordaz, who has truly earned by her actions the title of First Lady of Mexico.

I, therefore, respectfully invite you to join me in paying our most sincere respects to President Diaz Ordaz and his lady. Our love, admiration, and respect are theirs. Because of them our admiration and respect for Mexico have grown.

We wish them well in the future and many more years of service to Mexico and to mankind. And, as we would say in south Texas, "Hasta la vista, Presidente, y no olvide: Estamos con Diaz Ordaz."

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DORN). Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MILLER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today we should take note of America's great accomplishments and in so doing renew our faith and confidence in ourselves as individuals and as a nation. An average American family will spend approximately 16.5 percent of its disposable income on food compared to 25 percent in Western Europe and 50 percent in the Soviet Union.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. LEGGETT addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. GONZALEZ addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]